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CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
John L. Marshall, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article focuses on some of the recent developments in civil
litigation from June 1, 1998 to May 30, 1999, that have been effected
by the Virginia General Assembly and the Supreme Court of
Virginia. Each numbered discussion section is organized by topic in
alphabetical order. This article highlights legislation of general
interest to civil practitioners and does not purport to be all inclusive.
This article does not address criminal procedure.
II. RECENT LEGISLATION AFFECTING CIVIL PROCEDURE
The General Assembly enacted many measures during the 1999
session that affect civil litigation in state courts. These provisions
became effective on- July 1, 1999, unless otherwise noted.
A. Courts Not of Record
1. Judges
a. New Judgeships
The General Assembly increased the number of general district
court judges in Newport News from three to four and increased the
number of juvenile and domestic relations district court judges by
one in the Second, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, Twenty-fourth, Twenty-
fifth, and Twenty-sixth Districts.1
* Associate, McSweeney, Burtch & Crump, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. B.S., 1991; J.D.,
1995, University of Virginia.
1. See H.B. 1637, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Feb. 26, 1999,
ch. 11, 1999 Va. Acts 19) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-69.6:1 (Repl. Vol.
1999)).
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b. Notice of Vacancies
The Supreme Court, Judicial Council, and the Committee on
District Courts must publish notice of judicial vacancies and new
judgeships in a publication of general circulation among attorneys
licensed to practice in Virginia.'
c. Increased Per Diem Pay
The General Assembly increased the per diem pay from $150 to
$200 for substitute and retired judges.3
2. Hearings Involving Juveniles
The General Assembly passed legislation that tolls time limita-
tions for certain hearings involving juveniles during any period in
which the whereabouts of the child is unknown, the child has
escaped from custody, or the child has failed to appear pursuant to
a court order.4
3. Juvenile Competency
The General Assembly established juvenile court procedures for
determining whether a juvenile is competent to stand trial, for
restoration of competency, and for dispositions for unrestorably
incompetent juveniles.5 These bills, which are quite detailed, are
modeled after the adult competency provisions and are a recommen-
dation of the Commission on Youth.
4. Juvenile and Domestic Relations Intake Officer
Juvenile and domestic relations district court intake officers are
now required to accept and file a petition when family abuse is
2. See H.B. 2297, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Mar. 22, 1999,
ch. 319,1999 Va. Acts 362-63) (codified as amended at VA. CODEANN. § 16.1-69.9:3 (Repl. Vol.
1999)).
3. See H.B. 2076, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Mar. 28, 1999,
ch. 730, 1999 Va. Acts 1250) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-69.44 (Repl. Vol.
1999)).
4. See H.B. 2604, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Mar. 5, 1999,
ch. 58, 1999 Va. Acts 56) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-277.1 (Repl. Vol.
1999)).
5. See S.B. 1039, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Apr. 7, 1999,
ch. 958, 1999 Va. Acts 2498) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-356 to -361 (Repl. Vol. 1999));
H.B. 2043, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Apr. 7, 1999, ch. 997, 1999
Va. Acts 2642) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-356 (Repl. Vol. 1999)).
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alleged and a protective order is sought.6 House Bill 2033 provides
the definition of "family abuse."7
5. Removal of Action
House Bill 1583 provides for the removal from general district
court to circuit court of actions involving more than $3000 if the
defendant states a substantial defense to the action exclusive of the
sole issue of the amount or computation of damages.8 The former
law allowed removal for any substantial defense, including a defense
regarding the amount or computation of damages.9
6. Satisfaction of Judgments
Ajudgment creditor is now required to give written notification of
payment or satisfaction of ajudgment to the clerk of court where the
judgment is entered.'"
B. Courts of Record
1. Judges
The General Assembly increased the number of circuit court
judges for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit from six to seven." That
circuit consists of the City of Fredericksburg and the Counties of
Caroline, Essex, Hanover, King George, Lancaster, Northumber-
land, Richmond, Spotsylvania, Stafford, and Westmoreland.
6. See H.B. 2034, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Mar. 5, 1999,
ch. 54,1999 Va. Acts 52) (codified as amended atVA. CODEANN. § 16.1-260 (Repl. Vol. 1999)).
7. See H.B. 2033, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Mar. 28,1999,
ch. 665, 1999 Va. Acts 1069) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (Repl. Vol.
1999)).
8. See H.B. 1583, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Mar. 28, 1999,
ch. 717, 1999 Va. Acts 1198) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-92 (Repl. Vol.
1999)).
9. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-92 (Cum. Supp. 1998)).
10. See H.B. 1865, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Mar. 24, 1999,
ch. 370, 1999 Va. Acts 422) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-94.01 (Repl. Vol.
1999)).
11. See H.B. 1624, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Feb. 26, 1999,
ch. 10, 1999 Va. Acts 18) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-507 (Repl. Vol. 1999)).
1999] 803
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2. Juries
a. Exemption from Service
Persons eligible to claim an exemption from jury service may
serve if they wish, but are exempt from such service upon their
request.'" The former statute provided that such person may claim
the exemption, but did not make clear that such person may serve
if they wish.
b. Juror Selection
The maximum number of jury commissioners for each judicial
circuit was increased from nine to fifteen. 3
c. Selection
A statutory provision allowing a party to move for selection of
jurors by lot was eliminated. Instead, jurors will be selected
randomly. '"
C. Docket Control by Courts
A court can now dismiss an action without notice to the parties if
the case has been on the docket for three years with no orders or
proceedings other than continuances. 5 The clerk of court must
provide notice to the parties after dismissal, and the parties have
one year to move to reinstate the case for cause. 6
D. Immunity
The General Assembly provided immunity from liability for any
damages resulting from an act or omission related to the installation
12. See S.B. 967, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Mar. 17, 1999,
ch. 153, 1999 Va. Acts 183) (codified as amended at VA. CODEANN. § 8.01-341.1 (Cum. Supp.
1999)).
13. See H.B. 2753, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Mar. 17, 1999,
ch. 221, 1999 Va. Acts 245) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-343 (Cum. Supp.
1999)).
14. See S.B. 187, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Feb. 4, 1999, ch.
3, 1999 Va. Acts 3) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-357 (Cum. Supp. 1999)).
15. See H.B. 1565, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Mar. 28, 1999,
ch. 652, 1999 Va. Acts 1044) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-335 (Cum. Supp.
1999)).
16. See id.
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or inspection of child restraint devices (absent gross negligence or
willful misconduct), provided that the person has successfully met
the minimum training standards established by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Transportation for the installation of child restraint
devices.'7
E. Local Court Rules
The General Assembly passed a bill that will have a major impact
on local rules of practice and procedure. House Bill 2522, which
becomes effective July 1, 2000, limits the rules that general district
and circuit courts may prescribe to those rules necessary to promote
proper order and decorum and the efficient use of the clerk's office
and courthouse facilities."8 The bill invalidates any other rule and
states that it is the clear intent of the General Assembly that there
be no local rules and that any docket control procedures not affect
the substantive rights of litigants. 9 The Courts of Justice Commit-
tees and the supreme court were asked to review and recommend to
the 2000 Session of the General Assembly which matters are docket
control procedures and which are local rules. 0
F. Liens--Serving Notice on Financial Institutions
A financial institution is required to respond within twenty-one
days to a notice of lien from a judgment creditor or his attorney.2'
The financial institution must indicate the amount of money held by
the institution pursuant to the notice of lien.22
17. See S.B. 1329, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Mar. 22, 1999,
ch. 293, 1999 Va. Acts 399) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-226.5 (Cam. Supp.
1999)).
18. See H.B. 2522, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Mar. 29, 1999,
ch. 839, 1999 Va. Acts 1528) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-4 (Cum. Supp.
1999)).
19. See id.
20. See id-
21. See H.B. 1527, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Mar. 5, 1999,
ch. 48, 1999 Va. Acts 48) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-502.1 (Cam. Supp.
1999)).
22. See id.
1999]
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G. Medical Malpractice Limit
The amount recoverable in a medical malpractice case has been
raised from $1 million to $1.5 million, exclusive of interestY The
amendment further provides that the $1.5 million limit will increase
by $50,000 annually through July 1, 2006, and by $75,000 in 2007
and 2008.24 The 2008 increase will be the final increaseY Each
increase will apply to acts of malpractice occurring on or after the
effective date of the increase .26 The provisions of this chapter became
effective on August 1, 1999.27
H. Personal Jurisdiction
The General Assembly established the courts' personal jurisdiction
over any person who transmits or causes the transmission of
unsolicited bulk electronic mail to or through an electronic ,mail
service provider's computer network located in Virginia.'
I Pleadings
1. Amendment of Pleadings When There Is Confusion in Trade
Name/Relation Back
The statute of limitations will now be tolled when a party
incorrectly asserts a claim against the wrong party because the
trade name of the incorrectly named party is substantially similar
to the trade name of the intended party.29 However, the intended
party or its agent must have notice of the claim, and the incorrect
23. See S.B. 1230, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Mar. 28, 1999,
ch. 711, 1999 Va. Acts 1190) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Cum.
Supp. 1999)).
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See H.B. 1714, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Mar. 29, 1999,
ch. 905, 1999 Va. Acts 1745) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-328.1, 18.2-152.2, -152.4, -
152.12 (Cum. Supp. 1999)); H.B. 1668, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act
of Mar. 29, 1999, ch. 904, 1999 Va. Acts 1742) (codified at VA. CODEANN. §§ 8.01-328.1, 18.2-
152.2, -152.4, -152.12 (Cum. Supp. 1999)); S.B. 881, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999)
(enacted as Act of Mar. 29, 1999, ch. 886, 1999 Va. Acts 1693) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§
8.01-328.1, 18.2-152.2, -152.4, -152.12 (Cum. Supp. 1999)).
29. See H.B. 2582, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Mar. 28, 1999,
ch. 686, 1999 Va. Acts 1123) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-6.2 (Cum. Supp.
1999)).
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claim must have been asserted before the applicable statute of
limitations has run.O
This bill also tolls the statute of limitations when a pleading
against the estate of a decedent is served or attempted on an
executor who, at the time of service, had no authority to accept such
service.3 '
2. Extensions for Filing
House Bill 2359 would permit the supreme court and the court of
appeals to grant a thirty-day extension for filing documents upon
motion, for good cause, and to attain the ends of justice.32 Currently,
filing deadlines are mandatory, and there is no provision for an
extension even when there is an extreme emergency. This bill is not
meant to change the mandatory nature of deadlines, but it does
provide these two courts with the discretion to allow an extension in
limited circumstances. This bill will not become effective unless it
is reenacted by the General Assembly in 2000.
31
J. Release of Liability/Right of Recision by Plaintiff
An unrepresented personal injury plaintiff who executes a release
of liability within thirty days of the incident giving rise to the claim
may rescind the settlement until midnight of the third business day
after the day the release was executed.34 The recision must be in
writing and all settlement proceeds returned.
K. Service by Publication
A party shall recover the costs of publication when that party
receives final judgment.36 However, the cost of such publication shall
be paid initially by the party seeking service.37
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See H.B. 2359, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Mar. 29, 1999,
ch. 872, 1999 Va. Acts 1643) (to be codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-689 if reenacted by the
2000 General Assembly).
33. See id.
34. See H.B. 2560, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Mar. 22, 1999,
ch. 326, 1999 Va. Acts 370) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-425.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999)).
35. See id.
36. See S.B. 941, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Mar. 24, 1999,
ch. 353, 1999 Va. Acts 400) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-316 (Cum. Supp.
1999)).
37. See id.
1999]
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L Venue
1. Where Plaintiff Resides
House Bill 1899 clarifies that venue lies in any city or county
wherein any of the plaintiffs reside if all of the defendants (1) are
unknown or (2) are nonresidents of the Commonwealth. 8 Courts had
previously interpreted the statute to mean that such venue is
allowed only if no other permissible venue is available.39
2. Actions Under Contracts Related to Construction
Virginia Code section 8.01-262.1 was amended to make unenforce-
able any provision in a construction contract mandating that any
action on the contract be brought in a location outside of the
Commonwealth. °
M. Writ of Possession
Writs of Possession shall be issued within one year of the entry of
judgment for possession in unlawful entry and detainer actions,
unless a landlord has accepted rent payments without reservation.4'
N. Y2K Issues
The General Assembly passed several measures addressing Y2K
issues that are relevant to civil litigators.
1. Discoverability of Documents
House Bill 1663 provides that Y2K documents and assessments
shall not be discoverable or admissible in evidence unless ordered by
the court for good cause shown after an in camera review.42
38. H.B. 1899, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Mar. 10, 1999, ch.
73, 1999 Va. Acts 75) (codified as amended at VA. CODEANN. § 8.01-262 (Cum. Supp. 1999)).
39. See id.
40. See H.B. 2431, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Mar. 10, 1999,
ch. 130, 1999 Va. Acts 159) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-262.1 (Cum. Supp.
1999)).
41. See H.B. 2552, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Mar. 28, 1999,
ch. 683, 1999 Va. Acts 1116) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-471 (Cum. Supp.
1999)).
42. See H.B. 1663, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Feb. 27, 1999,
ch. 17, 1999 Va. Acts 25) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-418.3 (Cum. Supp.
1999)).
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2. Immunity for Disclosure of Information
The General Assembly provided immunity to any person who
causes injury by disclosing information about the Y2K problem;
however, the disclosure must be made in good faith.43 Immunity
does not attach for disclosures that are for profit, material and false,
inaccurate, or misleading." The bill does not affect any other
available remedies. 5 The bill contained an emergency clause and
became effective immediately.4
3. Immunity for Government Officials and Employees
Officers or employees of the Commonwealth or its political
subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities shall not be held liable
for any claim based on failure of a computer program, database, etc.,
relating to the Y2K date change.4 Immunity conferred by this
legislation does not cover gross negligence or willful misconduct
4. Limiting Y2K Liability
The General Assembly passed the following provisions regarding
liability and damages based on a Y2K problem:
[a.] No person shall be liable to any person who is (i) not in privity
of contract with such person, (ii) not a person to whom an express
warranty has been extended by such person, or (iii) in the case of a
trust, not the beneficiary of a trust administered by such person.
[b.] No person shall be liable for damages caused by a delay or
interruption in performance, or in the delivery of goods or services,
resulting from or in connection with a Year 2000 problem to the extent
such Year 2000 problem was caused by (i) a third party or (ii) a third
party's Year 2000 problem.
[c.] No employee, officer, or director shall be liable in his capacity
as such to any person.
43. See H.B. 1671, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Mar. 29, 1999,
ch. 859, 1999 Va. Acts 1600).
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See H.B. 2158, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Apr. 7, 1999,
ch. 1002, 1999 Va. Acts 2653) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-226.6 (Cum.
Supp. 1999)).
48. See id.
1999]
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[d.] No person shall be liable for consequential or punitive
damages.
[e.] Total damages shall not exceed actual direct damages.
[f.] This [bill] shall not affect the right of recovery for damages in
connection with wrongful death, personal injury, or property damage.49
III. RECENT DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
A. Additur
In Walker v. Mason,5 ° the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the
trial court in each of three cases improperly set aside damage
verdicts for inadequacy and erred in applying the additur statute to
increase the awards.5' The supreme court held that each of the trial
courts misapplied the rule annunciated in Bowers v. Sprouse52 that
"a jury award in a personal injury action which compensates a
plaintiff for the exact amount of the plaintiffs medical expenses and
other special damages is inadequate as a matter of law, irrespective
of whether those damages were controverted."" The court noted that
when the jury verdict is not in the exact amount of all the special
damages claimed, like the situation in Walker, the trial court must
review the evidence under traditional principles relating to the
adequacy of jury verdicts. 4
The Walker court limited the Bowers rule to those factual
situations in which the jury verdict is identical to the full amount of
the special damages.55 The rationale underlying the rule does not
extend to an award which deviates from the amount of all the special
damages claimed, even if the amount of the verdict corresponds to
an identifiable portion of the special damages. 6
49. S.B. 983, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Apr. 7, 1999, ch. 954,
1999 Va. Acts 2491) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-227.1 to -227.3).
50. 257 Va. 65, 510 S.E.2d 734 (1999).
51. See id. at 72, 510 S.E.2d at 737.
52. 254 Va. 428, 492 S.E.2d 637 (1997).
53. Id. at 431, 492 S.E.2d at 639.
54. See Walker, 257 Va. at 72, 510 S.E.2d at 737.
55. See id. at 68, 510 S.E.2d at 735.
56. See id.
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B. Attorneys'Fees
In Lansdowne Development Co. v. Xerox Realty," the Supreme
Court of Virginia affirmed a decree awarding $908,007.73 for
attorneys' fees and $234,100.32 for other litigation expenses.58 The
award of fees was made under a provision of a contract permitting
the prevailing party to recover "all litigation expenses, including
actual attorneys' fees, which shall not be unreasonable, and court
costs."59
The court did note that the contractual term "'all litigation
expenses' cannot be so broadly construed as to include any charges
made by an attorney to a client in the course of litigation."0 Charges
made in this case included conference room expenses in amounts
ranging from $1.50 to $11.00.61 Other charges were made for meals
and items delineated as "Miscellaneous" and "Cash Expense."6 2 The
court commented that "some of these charges are not direct costs of
litigation and arguably should have been excluded in the award of
costs recommended by the commissioner and approved by the
chancellor."63 However, the purchaser failed to make a particularized
objection to any of these charges during the commissioner's hearing
or in its exceptions to the commissioner's report.' The court held
that a generalized exception was insufficient to direct the chancellor
or the appellate court to which of the myriad of individual charges
the purchaser objects.65 Therefore, the purchaser failed to ade-
quately preserve this issue for appeal, and under Rule 5:25 of the
Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia these objections were denied
appellate review.66 The court further noted that it is not the duty of
the chancellor, or of the court on appeal, to conduct sua sponte a
review of the record of the commissioner's hearing to determine the
legitimacy of every individual item.6
57. 257 Va. 392, 514 S.E.2d 157 (1999).
58. See id. at 400, 514 S.E.2d at 160-61.
59. Id. at 403, 514 S.E.2d at 162.
60. Id. at 403, 514 S.E.2d at 163.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 403-04, 514 S.E.2d at 163.
66. See id. at 404,514 S.E.2d at 163.
67. See id.
1999"1
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C. Charitable Immunity
In Mooring v. Virginia Wesleyan College,6" the Supreme Court of
Virginia held that the defendant was not entitled to charitable
immunity because he was not engaged in the charity's work at the
time of the alleged negligence.69
The plaintiff in Mooring lost a thumb when the defendant closed
a door on his hand at the Boys & Girls Club of Hampton Roads.7 °
The defendant, Braley, was a professor at Virginia Wesleyan College
and established a program with the club in which students in his
recreation and leisure studies program were required to spend six
hours observing children and volunteering at the club.71 Braley was
at the club to observe one of his students who was conducting a
wellness and body conditioning program for teenagers. 72 At the time
of the accident, Braley was not at the club to perform any of its
work, but instead was carrying out his duties as a professor at
Virginia Wesleyan College.73 As a result, Braley was not entitled to
rely on the doctrine of charitable immunity.74 Therefore, the
supreme court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs
motion for judgment.75
D. Constitutionality of Statutory Cap on Damages in Medical
Malpractice Cases
In Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Services of Richmond,76 the
Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the constitutionality of the
medical malpractice cap,77 and reaffirmed its prior holding in
Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospitals.78 The plaintiff argued that
the medical malpractice cap was unconstitutional on seven inde-
pendent grounds including that the cap (1) violates the right to trial
by jury;79 (2) constitutes special legislation in violation of article IV,
68. 257 Va. 509, 514 S.E.2d 619 (1999).
69. See id. at 512, 514 S.E.2d at 621.
70. See id. at 510, 514 S.E.2d at 620.
71. See id. at 511, 514 S.E.2d at 620.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 512, 514 S.E.2d at 621.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. 257 Va. 1, 509 S.E.2d 307 (1999).
77. See id. at 7, 509 S.E.2d at 310.
78. 237 Va. 87, 376 S.E.2d 525 (1989); see Pulliam, 257 Va. at 6, 509 S.E.2d at 321.
79. See Pulliam, 257 Va. at 10-15, 509 S.E.2d at 312-15.
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section 14 of the Constitution of Virginia;" (3) constitutes a taking
of private property in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and article I, section 11 of the Constitution of
Virginia;8' (4) violates due process; 2 (5) violates equal protection;8"
(6) violates separation of powers;' and (7) invades the province of
the judiciary. 5 The supreme court rejected each of the arguments.8 6
The court also ruled that the award of prejudgment interest was
subject to the statutory cap on damages.8
As discussed above, the 1999 General Assembly raised the cap on
medical malpractice damages.88
E. Cross Examination of a Witness
In Food Lion, Inc. v. Cox, 9 the Supreme Court of Virginia held
that cross examination of a witness is not a privilege but an absolute
right.9" Therefore, the trial court's ruling that deprived a civil party
of the right to cross-examine witnesses called by another party as
adverse witnesses was error.91
The plaintiff, Cox, filed a motion for judgment alleging she was
injured by Food Lion's failure to maintain its store in a reasonably
safe condition.92 Cox called four store employees as adverse wit-
nesses. 93 Defense counsel prepared to cross-examine the first
witness, but the trial court ruled sua sponte that the defendant was
not entitled to examine its own employees until it called them as
witnesses for the defense.94 The defendant objected to that ruling
and addressed the same objection to the other three employees. 95
The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of
$25,000.96 On appeal, the supreme court held that the trial court's
80. See id. at 15-19, 509 S.E.2d at 315-17.
81. See id. at 19-20, 509 S.E.2d at 317-18.
82. See id. at 20, 509 S.E.2d at 318.
83. See id. at 20-21, 509 S.E.2d at 318-319.
84. See id. at 21-22, 509 S.E.2d at 319.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 23, 509 S.E.2d at 319.
87. See id. at 24-25, 509 S.E.2d at 320-21.
88. See supra Part H.G.
89. 257 Va. 449, 513 S.E.2d 860 (1999).
90. See id. at 450-51, 513 S.E.2d at 861.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 450, 513 S.E.2d at 861.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
1999]
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ruling was not "harmless error" and that the cross-examination of
witnesses is an absolute right.97
F. Finality
In Wagner v. Shird," the Supreme Court of Virginia held that
pursuant to Virginia Supreme Court Rule 1:1, the trial court did not
have jurisdiction over the case when it entered an order of remittitur
because the court's thirty-day limit for suspending its final order
expired without entry of an order to extend the stay.99
Wagner filed a motion for judgment for injuries sustained and
medical expenses incurred as a result of an automobile accident.' 0
On January 6, 1998, the jury returned a plaintiffs verdict in the
amount of $106,000.101 That same day, the circuit court entered a
final order.0 2 Subsequently, in an order dated January 27, 1998, the
court stayed the final order.103 Specifically, the court stated, "the
Order of Final Judgment of January 6, 1998 is stayed or suspended
for a period of 30 days for argument and decision upon [Shird's]
Motion for Remittitur."0 4 The court heard arguments on February
24, 1998, and reduced the jury's verdict to $60,000.1°5 A final written
order of remittitur and final judgment were not entered until April
21, 1998.106
The supreme court noted that the trial court suspended the
January 6, 1998 order within the twenty-one-day period allowed in
Rule 1:1.107 However, the stay "was expressly limited to 'a period of
30 days.'" 8 Since the court did not enter an additional order within
that thirty-day period to continue the stay, the January 6, 1998
order became final well before April 21, 1998.109 The pendency of
Shird's motion did not extend or toll the running of the thirty-day
period."0 Similarly, an oral ruling from the bench does not extend
97. See id.
98. 257 Va. 584, 514 S.E.2d 613 (1999).
99. See id. at 585, 514 S.E.2d at 614.
100. See id. at 585-86, 514 S.E.2d at 614.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 587, 514 S.E.2d at 615.
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
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the length of the stay."' A court speaks only through its written
orders.12 Therefore, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to enter
the order on April 21, 1998, and that ruling was a nullity. 3
G. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
In Gray v. INOVA Health Care Services,114 the Supreme Court of
Virginia held that there is no cause of action for negligent infliction
of emotional distress and its symptomatic effects." 5 The motion for
judgment alleged that Gray's three-year-old daughter, Kira, was
admitted to INOVA to undergo a lumbar puncture test for meningi-
tis, which was negligently administered." 6 The test caused Kira's
body to convulse, stopped her breathing, and caused her body to turn
blue." 7 Mrs. Gray observed her daughter's reaction and claimed she
experienced extreme fright and shock, temporarily blacked out, fell
to the floor, and became physically sick and vomited." 8 Mrs. Gray
claimed she continued to suffer from mental anguish and emotional
trauma."
9
The supreme court noted that it has consistently held that there
can be no actionable negligence unless there is a legal duty, a
violation of that duty, and a consequent injury. 2 ° In this case, the
court held that INOVA owed Mrs. Gray no duty.12 ' Kira was the
patient undergoing the test, and it was Kira to whom INOVA owed
a duty of care. 122 The court affirmed the trial court's judgment
sustaining the demurrer. I"
H. Nonsuit
In Kelly v. Carrico," the Supreme Court of Virginia held that
because a nonsuit motion was made prior to submission of the case
to the trial judge for consideration of dispositive motions, the grant
111. See id.
112. See i.
113. See id.
114. 257 Va. 597, 514 S.E.2d 355 (1999).
115. See id. at 598, 514 S.E.2d at 355-56.
116. See itd.
117. See id. at 598, 514 S.E.2d at 356.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 600, 514 S.E.2d at 356-57.
124. 256 Va. 282, 504 S.E.2d 368 (1998).
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of a second nonsuit was proper, and the judgment of the trial court
was affirmed.'25
On the morning of trial, after the jury had been impaneled, Kelly
asked the trial court to enter judgment in his favor on the
pleadings.'26 Kelly pled a new matter in his grounds of defense,
which, if true, would show that Carrico was guilty of contributory
negligence, thus barring Carrico from any type of recovery.2 7
Because Carrico had failed to file a pleading in response to this new
matter, Kelly moved for judgment on the pleadings. 2 8 While hearing
arguments on the motion, the court indicated that it wanted to
review a certain case before deciding Kelly's motion. 2 9 During a
colloquy with the court, Carrico's counsel asked for a second
nonsuit 30 The court then took a recess.' 3 ' At the conclusion of the
recess, Carrico's counsel asked for permission to amend the plead-
ings to respond to the new matter pled in Kelly's grounds of
defense. 32  The court did not rule on this request. Instead, it
granted the motion for a nonsuit 3
3
The supreme court held that Carrico made the nonsuit motion
before the trial court recessed to consider the merits of Kelly's
dispositive motion; therefore, granting the nonsuit was
appropriate.14 The court distinguished Wells v. Lorcom House Con-
dominiums' Council of Co-Owners 35 because in that case the parties
submitted to the court for a ruling the defendant's demurrer, plea in
bar, and motion to dismiss. 36 All briefing and oral arguments were
concluded, and 'lalny one of those pleadings [was] dispositive if the
court ruled in favor of the defendants."'37 No party contemplated
any further action save a decision from the court.' Only months
later, while still waiting for a decision from the trial court, did the
plaintiff move for a nonsuit1 9 The Wells court found that the action
125. See id. at 286-87, 504 S.E.2d at 370-71.
126. See id. at 284, 504 S.E.2d at 369.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 285, 504 S.E.2d at 369.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. 237 Va. 247, 377 S.E.2d 381 (1989).
136. See Kelly, 256 Va. at 285, 504 S.E.2d at 370.
137. Id. (quoting Wells, 237 Va. at 252, 377 S.E.2d at 384).
138. See id. at 286, 504 S.E.2d at 370.
139. See id.
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had been submitted to the court for decision and that it would be
improper to grant the nonsuit.
140
In Kelly, the court found there was no submission because the
nonsuit motion was made before the court recessed to consider the
merits of Kelly's motion, and Carrico did not yield the dispositive
issues to the court for consideration and decision." Therefore,
granting the second nonsuit was proper.142
I. Personal Jurisdiction
In Peninsula Cruise, Inc. v. New River Yacht Sales, Inc.." the
Supreme Court of Virginia held that the trial court erred in refusing
to exercise personal jurisdiction pursuant to Virginia Code
section 8.01-328.1 (the long-arm statute) over a Florida corporation
that delivered a boat to Virginia and had other contacts with
Virginia.14
The plaintiff corporation contacted the defendant about the
purchase of a sportfishing boat.145 After a trip to Florida and
negotiations about certain terms, the parties agreed that the
delivery point of the boat would be South Carolina. 46 However, on
the way to South Carolina the boat developed an oil leak and
sustained damage to the propeller.'47 The defendant then agreed, for
additional consideration, to deliver the boat to Virginia. 48 After
delivery, the defendant told the plaintiff to have the needed repair
work performed and that the defendant would consider reimburse-
ment to the plaintiff.49 Plaintiff brought this action to recover,
among other things, the cost of the repairs made to the boat. 5 '
The defendant filed a special plea asserting that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction over it.' 5' The circuit court agreed, holding that
it lacked sufficient basis upon which to exercise personal jurisdiction
over the defendant, and dismissed the action.'52
140. See Wells, 237 Va. at 252, 377 S.E.2d at 384.
141. See Kelly, 256 Va. at 286, 504 S.E.2d at 370.
142. See id. at 287, 504 S.E.2d at 371.
143. 257 Va. 315, 512 S.E.2d 560 (1999).
144. See id. at 320-21, 512 S.E.2d at 563.
145. See id. at 318, 512 S.E.2d at 561.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 317, 512 S.E.2d at 561.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 318, 512 S.E.2d at 561.
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The supreme court reversed, holding that Virginia Code section
8.01-328.1 authorized the circuit court to exercise jurisdiction over
the defendant because the defendant transacted business in Virginia
within the meaning of the long-arm statute. 53 The court noted that
the defendant delivered the boat to Virginia and that the defendant's
employees had telephone conversations with the plaintiffin Virginia
to discuss the status of repairs and improvements to the boat. 54 By
taking these actions, the defendant purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within Virginia.'55 The court
stated:
Maintenance of this action in Virginia "does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice" because the defendant,
through its purposeful acts, had sufficient contacts with this
Commonwealth. The defendant's contacts with this Commonwealth
make it reasonable for the defendant to be required to defend the
plaintiffs action in this State.156
J. Service of Process
In Gilpin v. Joyce,"5 7 the Supreme Court of Virginia held that a
defendant who makes a general appearance without having been
served with process is not entitled to assert the bar against judg-
ment provided by Virginia Supreme Court Rule 3:3.'
On June 26, 1996, Gilpin filed a motion for judgment seeking
damages from Joyce and Leslie Dailey for injuries resulting from an
automobile accident. 5 9 "Gilpin did not request service of process on
either defendant." 6 ° On October 30, 1997, Joyce, by counsel, filed a
motion to dismiss citing part of Rule 3:3 which provides: "No
judgment shall be entered against a defendant who was served with
process more than one year after the commencement of the action
against him unless the court finds as a fact that the plaintiff
exercised due diligence to have timely service on him."'6' At the
153. See id. at 320-21, 512 S.E.2d at 563.
154. See id. at 321, 512 S.E.2d at 563.
155. See id.
156. Id.
157. 257 Va. 579, 515 S.E.2d 124 (1999).
158. See id. at 582, 515 S.E.2d at 126.
159. See id. at 580, 515 S.E.2d at 125.
160. Id. at 581, 515 S.E.2d at 125.
161. Id. (quoting VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:3).
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same time, Joyce filed grounds of defense, a counterclaim, a
certificate of service of interrogatories, and a motion to produce.
162
On December 1, 1997, during oral argument on the motion to
dismiss, the parties stipulated that Gilpin failed to exercise due
diligence in obtaining service of process on Joyce.163 The court
requested briefs on the issue, and on May 29, 1998, entered an order
sustaining the motion to dismiss.16
The supreme court reversed the trial court and noted that an
appearance for any purpose other than questioning the jurisdiction
of the court is general and not special, despite a claim that the
appearance is only special. 65 By filing a grounds of defense and
counterclaim, Joyce made a general appearance. 166 Such a general
appearance is a "waiver of process.., and confers jurisdiction of the
person on the court."167 Virginia Code section 8.01-277, which allows
a person upon whom process has been served to take advantage of
any defect by filing a motion to quash, failed to provide any relief to
Joyce because it "applies only where process has actually been
served on the defendant."161 The court reached the same conclusion
when applying Rule 3:3.69 Under the rule's express terms, it applies
only where there has been service of process. 7 °
The court rejected Joyce's argument that his general appearance
more than one year after the commencement of the action should be
equivalent to service of process more than one year after the
commencement of an action.17 It reasoned that service and appear-
ance were distinguishable in their levels of compulsion.172 Joyce was
under no compulsion to make an appearance because he was never
served with process. 73 By comparison, a defendant who actually
receives service of process, but wants to challenge it, must make an
appearance or risk default. 74 Unfortunately for Joyce, he made a
general appearance without having been served with process and
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See id. (citing Norfolk & Ocean View Ry. Co. v. Consolidated Turnpike Co., 111 Va.
131, 136, 68 S.E. 346, 348 (1910)).
166. See id.
167. Id. (quoting Nixon v. Rowland, 192 Va. 47, 50, 63 S.E.2d 757, 759 (1951)).
168. Id. at 582, 515 S.E.2d at 126.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id.
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was therefore unable to take advantage of section 8.01-277 or Rule
3:3.
K Sovereign Immunity
In Wagoner ex rel. Wagoner v. Benson,1 5 the Supreme Court of
Virginia held that the School Board and a bus driver were not en-
titled to sovereign immunity in a suit filed by a minor pedestrian
who was injured when she was hit by a car while crossing the street
to board a school bus. 76 Sovereign immunity was not available as a
defense because the School Board's motor vehicle liability policy
covered accidents that arose out of the "loading or unloading of an
auto."17 The court held that Virginia Code section 22.1-194 abro-
gates a School Board's sovereign immunity to a limited degree,
including when the School Board is an insured under a policy
covering a vehicle involved in an accident.77 The School Board
is then "'subject to action up to, but not beyond, the limits of valid
and collectible insurance in force to cover the injury complained of
'179
The insurance policy at issue did not define "loading," but the
court held that "loading" was a function performed by the bus driver
and included "turning on flashing warning lights and extending the
mechanical stop sign and the metal safety gate, all of which remain
engaged until all students are inside or have been 'loaded onto' the
school bus." 8 °
L. Spoliation of Evidence
In Austin v. Consolidation Coal Co.,181 the Supreme Court of
Virginia ruled that an employer has no duty to preserve evidence for
the benefit of an employee's potential tort action against a third
party.18
2
The plaintiff, an employee of Consolidation, was injured when a
hose burst during the course of his employment.'83 Consolidation
destroyed the hose before the plaintiff's experts had a chance to
175. 256 Va. 260, 505 S.E.2d 188 (1998).
176. See id.
177. Id. at 263, 505 S.E.2d at 189.
178. See id.
179. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-194 (Repl. Vol. 1997)).
180. Id.
181. 256 Va. 78, 501 S.E.2d 161 (1998).
182. See id. at 83-84, 501 S.E.2d at 163-64.
183. See id. at 80, 501 S.E.2d at 161.
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conduct independent testing.184 The court held that because
Consolidation had no legal duty to preserve the hose, the plaintiff
had no cause of action against it for intentional or negligent
spoliation of evidence." 5
M. Statute of Limitations
1. John Doe Defendants
In Rivera v. Witt,'86 the Supreme Court of Virginia held that a
John Doe defendant and an insured motorist later identified as the
John Doe are not considered the same entity for purposes of the
statute of limitations.'87 Therefore, the court affirmed dismissal of
the motion for judgment filed against the insured motorist after the
statute of limitations had run. 8
Rivera filed a motion for judgment against John Doe, an unknown
driver, for injuries she sustained in an automobile accident, and
served a copy of the motion on her uninsured motorist insurance
carrier.8 9 Several years later, she identified the John Doe motorist
who was insured."0 The trial court granted Rivera's motion to join
Witt, the John Doe motorist, as a defendant.'9 ' "Witt then filed a
plea in bar asserting that [the] cause of action against him was
barred because it was filed beyond the two-year limitations
period."'92 The trial court granted the plea and dismissed the motion
for judgment.' 9
In afFirming the trial court, the supreme court reasoned that
creating an exception to the statute of limitations whenever a
plaintiff could show that a defendant was not prejudiced by permit-
ting suit against him after the limitations period has expired would
be contrary to the established principle that statutes of limitations
are strictly enforced and must be applied unless the General
Assembly has clearly created an exception to their application. 94
184. See id. at 80, 501 S.E.2d at 162.
185. See id. at 83-84, 501 S.E.2d at 163-64.
186. 257 Va. 280, 512 S.E.2d 558 (1999).
187. See id. at 284-85, 512 S.E.2d at 560.
188. See id. at 285, 512 S.E.2d at 560.
189. See id. at 282, 512 S.E.2d at 559.
190. See id
191. See id.
192. Id.
193. See id.
194. See id. at 283, 512 S.E.2d at 559.
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This decision answered a question left unanswered by the court in
Truman v. Spivey. '95 In Truman, the court held that, for statute of
limitations purposes, an unidentified John Doe motorist and the
later identified uninsured motorist are considered the same entity
under Virginia Code section 38.1-381, the predecessor of Virginia
Code section 38.2-2206.196 Therefore, the statute of limitations is
tolled when a suit is filed against the unidentified John Doe
motorist.197 The Truman court specifically declined to determine
whether it would reach the same result if the subsequently identi-
fied motorist were an insured motorist. 9 '
The court answered that question in Rivera and held that the
John Doe defendant and a later identified insured motorist are not
considered the same entity and that the statute of limitations
continues to run until suit is filed against the insured motorist.'99
2. Contract Provisions Trump Statutes of Limitations
In Massie v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Virginia, °0 the Supreme
Court of Virginia affirmed the dismissal of an action arising from a
health care insurance contract that contained a twelve-month
limitation.21 The court reasoned that parties to a contract may agree
that an action to enforce the contract must be filed within a shorter
period of time than otherwise established by an applicable statute
of limitations.0 2 In such a situation, the tolling provisions of Virginia
Code section 8.01-229(E)(3) do not apply. 20 3
Massie had subscribed to a health insurance plan that paid less
than the entire amount of expenses incurred by Massie for oral
surgery.0 4 Massie filed a warrant in debt in general district court
that was removed to circuit court by the defendant Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of Virginia ("Blue Cross").0° Massie then nonsuited the
action one year after it was commenced and refied the motion for
judgment six months later.0 ' Blue Cross filed a special plea relying
195. 225 Va. 274, 302 S.E.2d 517 (1983).
196. See id. at 279, 302 S.E.2d at 519.
197. See id. at 281, 302 S.E.2d at 520.
198. See id.
199. See Rivera, 257 Va. at 284, 512 S.E.2d at 560.
200. 256 Va. 161, 500 S.E.2d 509 (1998).
201. See id. at 162, 500 S.E.2d at 510.
202. See id.
203. See id. at 165, 500 S.E.2d at 511.
204. See id. at 163-64, 500 S.E.2d at 510.
205. See id. at 163, 500 S.E.2d at 510.
206. See id.
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on a provision in the contract between the parties that required
proceedings to be brought within twelve months after a cause of
action accrued. °7 The trial court sustained the plea and dismissed
the action.0 8
On appeal, Massie did not challenge the validity of the twelve-
month limitation or argue that he filed the present action within
that time frame. 9 Rather, Massie argued that the action was
timely filed because he commenced his suit within six months after
entry of the nonsuit order and that even though he was bound by the
twelve-month limitation period in the contract, he was entitled to
the tolling provision of Virginia Code section 8.01-229(E)(3). 210
The supreme court held that the plain meaning of the statute
indicates that after a voluntary nonsuit the statute of limitations,
not a contractual period of limitations, is tolled, and the plaintiff
may recommence the suit within six months or the original period
of limitations, whichever is longer.211 The court noted that it "must
give effect to the intention of the parties as expressed in the
language of their contract, and the rights of the parties must be
determined accordingly."212  In this case, "the parties chose to
exclude the operation of the statute of limitations and, in so doing,
also excluded its exceptions."213
N. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In Early v. Landsidle,1 4 the Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed
an original petition for mandamus brought by the Attorney General
under Virginia Code section 8.01-653 for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.15
In this case, the Comptroller of Virginia notified the Attorney
General that he entertained doubts concerning the constitutionality
of two spending provisions enacted by the General Assembly as part
of Virginia's 1998-2000 Biennial Budget. 16 One questionable item
was the "per diem" payments to be made to legislators for legislative
207. See id-
208. See id. at 163, 500 S.E.2d at 510.
209. See id at 164, 500 S.E.2d at 511.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 165, 500 S.E.2d at 511.
212. Id. at 166, 500 S.E.2d at 512.
213. Id.
214. 257 Va. 365, 514 S.E.2d 153 (1999).
215. See id.
216. See id at 367-68, 514 S.E.2d at 154.
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activities involving the discharge of their duties when the Assembly
was not in session. 11 The second item was an increase in the
legislators' monthly allowance for office expenses and supplies from
$750 to $1250.218
The Attorney General filed a petition for a writ of mandamus
naming the Comptroller as a party defendant and asking for a
declaration that the increased payment levels were unconstitu-
tional 9.2 " The Attorney General later filed a motion to join the
General Assembly's clerks as additional defendants.22' The clerks
moved to dismiss the Attorney General's motion to join them, and
asserted that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking because the
Virginia Code requires the Attorney General to defend the constitu-
tionality of provisions challenged by the Comptroller.22'
The court found subject matter jurisdiction lacking because
Virginia Code section 8.01-653222 only permits the Attorney General
to petition the supreme court to seek payment of money that he
believes the Comptroller is improperly withholding. 223 Here, the
Attorney General, having assumed the role of a party defendant,
sought to invalidate these budgetary provisions and asked the court
for an order to make payment pursuant to the challenged items after
the beginning of the next General Assembly session in January
217. See id. at 368, 514 S.E.2d at 154.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See id. at 368, 514 S.E.2d at 155.
222. Virginia Code section 8.01-653 provides, in material part:
Whenever the Comptroller or the Treasurer of the Commonwealth shall notify
the Attorney General, in writing, that they, or either of them, entertain such
doubt respecting the proper construction or interpretation of any act of the
General Assembly which appropriates or directs the payment of money out of
the treasury of the Commonwealth, or respecting the constitutionality of any
such act, that they, or either of them, do not feel that it would be proper or safe
to pay such money until there has been a final adjudication by the Supreme
Court determining any and all such questions, and that, for such reason, they
will not make payments pursuant to such act until such adjudication has been
made, the Attorney General may file in such court a petition for a writ of
mandamus directing or requiring the Comptroller or Treasurer of the
Commonwealth, or both, to pay such money as provided by any such act at such
time in the future as may be proper.... The Comptroller and the Treasurer of
the Commonwealth, or either of them, as the case may be, shall be made a
party or parties defendant to any such petition and the court may, in its
discretion, cause such other officers or persons to be made parties defendant as
it may deem proper ....
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-653 (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cum. Supp. 1998).
223. See Earley, 257 Va. at 371, 514 S.E.2d at 156.
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2000.2 The statute does not permit the Attorney General to
challenge the constitutionality of an act by adding parties, here the
clerks, in the role of petitioners whom he expects will defend that act
and seek payment under it. 225 Thus, there was no request to direct
the Comptroller to pay money under a contested budget item, and
therefore, no subject matter jurisdiction under Virginia Code section
8.01-653.226
0. Venue
In Meyer v. Brown,227 the Supreme Court of Virginia found that
the trial court erred in overruling the defendant's objection to venue
in the City of Richmond. 228 The defendant's objection was based on
the fact that the accident occurred in Prince George County and the
defendant lived and worked in Chesterfield County.229
As an initial matter, the supreme court noted that the party
objecting to venue has the burden of establishing that the chosen
venue is improper230 and that permissible venue under the circum-
stances should be in the county or city where the defendant regu-
larly conducts affairs or business activities.31 The court went on to
discuss dictionary definitions of "affairs" and "regularly."23 2
The court held that evidence of the defendant's pleasure trips
through the City of Richmond to visit a son and of his passing
through the city or stopping there "for whatever reason" failed to
demonstrate that the defendant "conducts affairs or business
activity" within the city.23 3 Further, the court held that defendant's
seven visits per year to insurance brokerage firms and three
appearances per year at business seminars did not constitute
"regularly" conducting affairs or business activity within the city."4
The supreme court concluded that the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to sustain the defendant's objection to
224. See id. at 370-71, 514 S.E.2d at 156.
225. See id at 371, 514 S.E.2d at 156.
226. See id.
227. 256 Va. 53, 500 S.E.2d 807 (1998).
228. See id at 58, 500 S.E.2d at 810.
229. See id. at 55, 500 S.E.2d at 808.
230. See id. at 57, 500 S.E.2d at 809.
231. See id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-262(3) (Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cur. Supp. 1998).
232. See Meyer, 256 Va. at 57, 500 S.E.2d at 809-10.
233. See id. at 57, 500 S.E.2d at 810.
234. See id.
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venue. 3 1 As a result, the plaintiff's verdict for $1 million was
reversed. 6
P. Virginia Human Rights Act
In Conner v. National Pest Control Association,237 the Supreme
Court of Virginia, in affirming the trial court's dismissal of the
plaintiff's motion for judgment, held that the enactment of the 1995
amendments to the Virginia Human Rights Act238 ("VHRA")
eliminated a common law cause of action for wrongful termination
based on any public policy that is reflected in the VHRA, regardless
of whether the policy is articulated elsewhere. 9 The amendment
provides that [c]auses of action based upon the public policies
reflected in this chapter shall be exclusively limited to those actions,
procedures and remedies, if any, afforded by applicable federal or
state civil rights statutes or local ordinances."24
This case appears to bring closure to what had been a hotly
contested issue.24'
IV. CONCLUSION
The past year saw many new developments affecting civil
litigation in the courts of the Commonwealth. While this article does
not purport to be all inclusive, it is hoped that Virginia practitioners
will find the information contained in the article useful in the years
to come.
235. See id. at 58, 500 S.E.2d at 810.
236. See id.
237. 257 Va. 286, 513 S.E.2d 398 (1999).
238. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-714 to -725 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cam. Supp. 1999).
239. See id. at 290, 513 S.E.2d at 400.
240. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-725(D) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
241. See Doss v. Jamco, Inc., 254 Va. 362, 492 S.E.2d 441 (1997); Lockhart v. Common-
wealth Educ. Sys., 247 Va. 98,439 S.E.2d 328 (1994); Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 229
Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985).
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